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THE VALUE OF THE CHINESE CONNECTION
Roger Sullivan*
Americans find it very difficult to be dispassionate on the subject of
China. When people ask me, as you have in my informal remarks to this
Workshop, to specify what benefits or what value there is to the United
States-China relationship, if any, I always hesitate to answer. This is not just
because there are no simple answers, but also because the answers to the
questions depend on one's interests, expectations and perhaps, one's prej-
udices.
In July, 1971, President Nixon said that there can be no stable or
enduring peace without the participation of the People's Republic of China
(P.R.C.) and its 800 million people. While we believe that this statement is
generally still true, we can be a lot more specific about the value of the
so-called "Chinese Connection" today than we could in 1971. The United
States' establishment of closer ties with China, culminating in the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations, has made possible extensive exchanges on both
global and regional issues. We have been able to explore common interests
and to develop shared perspectives with a much greater openness and trust
than was possible in the past. Before the establishment of diplomatic
relations, our discussion of problems was, more or less, limited to an arm's
length exchange of positions. Now, there is much more give and take; a real
desire, not just to exchange views, but to resolve problems. There is a degree
of cooperativeness to the relationship that few had dreamed possible in the
early stages of normalization.
This very dramatic change in our relationship with China is a direct
result of normalization. There has been a reduction of tension between China
and the United States on several issues (Taiwan is a dramatic example of
that; Korea to a lesser, but still real degree). We have also reaped an
important side benefit, with the possibility of much closer relations with
Japan as a consequence of the good relations between China and the United
States. For the first time in this century, both Japan and the United States
are in a position of not having to choose between having good relations with
each other and having good relations with China. From the period after the
war until, at least, 1971-72, there was not only concern about the "Chinese
threat," but there was also the problem that American hostility towards
China was an obstacle to a closer Japanese-American relationship. It
* Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
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certainly was the major cause of opposition in Japan to the U.S.-Japan
security relationship.
In the Southeast Asian countries, there is not only a reduction in fear of
China (in fact, fear has changed to a great interest in cooperating with China
as a means of containing Vietnam), but also a diminution of fears about a
withdrawal from the area on the part of the United States. The United States
is redefining its relationship towards Asia, demonstrating by its normaliza-
tion of relations with China that, far from losing interest in the area, the
United States is becoming more deeply involved, although in a different way
from the past.
This new political relationship has also opened up new economic
possibilities. Here, the China euphoria has been mislaid. It is very easy to
exaggerate the benefits that can flow to the United States, in terms of trade
and economic relations, from normalization. Those who like to dismiss that
relationship have emphasized China's poverty and the relative unimportance
of China as a trading nation. Both of these factors are very true. There are,
however, opportunities for the United States. We have resolved most of the
obstacles to an economic relationship with China. In particular, we have
solved the claims and assets problem; we have disposed of, though we have
not exactly solved the textile problem; we have also paved the way for the
signing of the trade agreement which was initialled by Juanita Kreps on her
visit to China.' This trade agreement - which I am confident will meet with
support in Congress - will extend to China "most-favored nation" status and
provide not only greater opportunities for China to export to the United
States, but will improve the climate in China for American exports and
American cooperative ventures, particularly in energy-related areas. We
have already had some extensive negotiations between American oil com-
panies and the Chinese on the exploration of China's offshore oil resources.
Questions always arise about all these stories we hear that China is
backing away from modernization and economic relationships with the
outside world. This is simply not the case. What we have seen in the last few
months is a reassessment on the part of the Chinese of the commitments or
semi-commitments they have already made; they wanted to make sure that
the decisions they were making were in line with their priorities. By no
means were the Chinese backing away from the basic policy of modernization
or their basic modernization program. In fact, in the month of May, the
Chinese have signed loan agreements with foreign governments and banks
totalling $21 billion. This is $21 billion of a total $26 billion to which the
Chinese have gained access. Negotiations are underway which could bring
1. See the text of William W. Clarke's speech, p. 92 infra.
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that total up to $30 billion. We now expect the Chinese to resume their
program of major capital purchases as they complete their reassessment.
These loan agreements should enable the Chinese to spend something on
the order of $50-60 billion on imports of capital goods and technology over
the next five years. Our exports to China this year should be well over one
billion dollars. By 1985 they should easily be in the range of about $5 billion
each year. This is certainly not going to solve America's economic problems,
but it is significant.
It is important that we take a long range view, keeping in mind that
what we do with China today is going to continue to affect events and
attitudes for the next twenty-five or thirty years or more. I would hate to see
us put ourselves in the position where, in the year 2000, we look back with
regret over some of the decisions we made or decisions we did not make in
1979-80. 1 do not know how many people realize the price we have paid over
the years for such a simple thing as John Foster Dulles' refusal to shake
hands with Chou En-Lai in 1954.
But when I say we should think strategically, I am not talking about
entering a military relationship with China. We are not trying to use China
as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. It would be a mistake to think in
those terms. We have said many times that we are not improving relations
for short term reasons. We are not playing the China card or any other
dangerous games with our relationship. Our goal, and what should continue
to be our goal, is a strong and secure China. By that we mean a China that
can provide the necessities to its own people and protect the capability to
maintain an independent foreign policy. A China like that could then play
the kind of a role that China must play if global and regional peace is to be
maintained.
Our opinion about China and the current Soviet paranoia have really
turned reality on its head. The danger to China has never come from its
strength, but from its weakness. China is now acknowledging that weakness
for the first time and is starting to do something about it. I saw the
beginnings of this in July last year when I went to China with Dr. Frank
Press, the President's Science Advisor. It was a very dramatic time when it
became apparent that China had made up its mind to open itself up to the
United States economically and technologically, as well as diplomatically. It
was absolutely clear on that visit that progress in our relations would come
very quickly. Deng Xiaoping left no doubt in our minds that he had made up
his mind that China had to move ahead and had to move very quickly if it
was going to rebuild its economy and its society from the bottom up. The
school system had been destroyed and the economy was barely functioning.
We could almost detect a note of desperation. It was clear that everyone we
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talked to knew that they had to do something, that they had to do it quickly,
and had to do it correctly or face collapse.
It was this realization and not any short-run considerations that
prompted the Chinese to move ahead with the United States. China needs a
long-term relationship, not just with the United States, but with Japan and
Europe in order to get the technology, the capital and the trade that it has to
have if it is going to modernize. At the same time, it is clear that they also
see this new relationship as a means of providing themselves with a
breathing space (a sort of political deterrence) from Soviet pressure.
I believe that it is crucial to regional and global peace that China not fail
in this modernization effort, that it succeed, at least to the extent of being
able to maintain its independence and play a constructive role in the region.
A China like that would not be a threat to anyone. Rather, a China which
found itself rejected by the outside world, unable to get the technology and
capital it needed, failing in its effort of modernization, embittered and
impoverished, and forced to come to terms, perhaps, with its hostile
neighbors, would be a threat to all of us.
Asia is and will continue to be of increasing importance to the United
States. Anything that happens in Asia will in one way or another affect or be
affected by China and the U.S.-China relationship. It took us thirty years,
two wars, many lives and billions of dollars to learn that lesson. I hope we
will not forget it.
COMMENTS
Michael Y. M. Kau*
In recent months, the Carter administration has been using various
public forums to defend it's policy and methods of normalizing relations with
the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). It is natural for administration
officials to explain policies of major significance to the nation on behalf of the
President in order to create public support and consensus. The presentation of
their arguments has, however, been less than candid. While stressing
enthusiastically the positive value of normalization and the Chinese connec-
tion, they fail to inform the public of all the possible flaws and risks involved.
They assert that Washington had obtained the best possible terms from
* Professor of Political Science, Brown University; Specialist on Chinese political
developments.
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Peking; Taiwan has become even more secure as a result of normalization;
and the Chinese connection shall be beneficial to peace and stability in Asia.
Serious questions can be raised with respect to these assertions.
The alleged benefits of our new policy are simply optimistic assumptions
on our part, clearly not proven facts. Such benefits may or may not be
forthcoming. Even if they can be achieved, the question remains as to what
risks and pitfalls we will have to face in the years ahead. Beyond the problem
of policy objectives, the method and process of normalization should also be
scrutinized. How an issue and its negoitations are handled is often just as
important as the ultimate outcome itself.
Before discussing these various questions, it is important to mention a
few facts about Taiwan, the party which our China deal affects most directly.
Taiwan has too often been treated as an abstract, dispensable pawn in the
superpower game between the United States and the P.R.C. In comparison
with a huge China, Taiwan may indeed appear quite small and insignificant.
It should be remembered, however, that Taiwan's population of over 17
million is four times larger than that of Israel and is larger than the
population of over 100 countries in the United Nations. Taiwan's current $26
billion two-way trade ranks twentieth in the world, and at present, Taiwan is
the eighth largest trading partner of the United States. With our explicit
initiatives and encouragements, the Republic of China (R.O.C.) on Taiwan
has been our faithful ally and friend for the last three decades. The island
and its people served well our strategic and political interests in Asia in the
era of the Cold War against Communist expansion and during the years of
the Vietnam War. Taiwan's prosperous economy has become the "success
story" of American foreign aid. Yet in the process of our involvements, we
have also helped create a peculiar international status for the island, to
which we have incurred a moral and political obligation for its security and
well-being. Hence, no discussion of our normalization policy can be meaning-
ful without taking into consideration the issue of Taiwan.
Turning to the substantive questions concerning the value of normaliza-
tion and the Chinese connection, first, the Administration argues that
normalizing our relations with the P.R.C. is a matter of "recognizing simple
reality." At issue here is not whether we should have recognized the P.R.C.,
but rather on what terms should recognition have taken place. By totally
accepting Peking's demands to withdraw recognition from the R.O.C. and to
terminate our 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan,' we have clearly
"abnormalized" our relations with Taiwan. The end result is that Taiwan is
reduced to a "non-entity," we "acknowledge" Peking's claim over the island,
and allow the future of its 17 million people to drift in limbo at China's
1. [19551 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
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mercy. Since the initiation of the Nixon-Kissinger negotiations with the
Chinese in 1972, the issue has been the crucial question of Taiwan's external
security vis-A-vis China. Peking leaders have threatened repeatedly to
liberate Taiwan by force, if necessary. It is absolutely incredible that the
Carter administration did not even ask the Chinese leaders for a pledge not
to use force to settle the Taiwan issue.
The weak negotiating position that the Administration took is indeed
hard to comprehend, especially when there is a clear consensus that under
the current Chinese domestic and external situation, the Chinese need us
more than we need them; we were in a position to negotiate from strength.
This same meek attitude of the Administration was clearly revealed again in
the original version of the Taiwan Omnibus Bill submitted by the President
to the Congress. The bill said nothing about our continued commitments to
Taiwan's military and economic security against external threat. Fortunate-
ly, Congress had the wisdom and courage to write into the final version of the
Taiwan Relations Act 2 what the Administration was, under pressure from
Peking, afraid to say.
Second, Administration officials argue that the P.R.C. has neither the
intention nor the capability to take over Taiwan. Of course, it may be true
that China would not and could not invade Taiwan immediately, but nobody
can tell what will happen in the long run. The Administration did not remind
us that Peking signed a peace pact with Tibet in 1951, only to use force to
crush the Tibetans in 1959. In 1962, China mobilized its forces to teach India
a bloody lesson. If this history is too remote to recall, China's invasion of
Vietnam last February ought to be still fresh in our minds. In spite of serious
warnings from the Soviet Union, China did not hesitate to use force to try to
achieve its foreign policy objectives in India. If Peking can justify its action in
Vietnam, it has even greater justification to use force on Taiwan. Besides, one
should remember that Peking has never renounced officially the use of force
to settle the Taiwan problem.
While the armed forces in Taiwan are well-trained and equipped, one
should not fail to recognize the simple fact that when the chips are down, in a
military confrontation between China and Taiwan, it will involve a contest
between a giant of 900 million people against a dwarf of 17 million. It would
surely be a very different contest from that between East and West Germany
or that between North and South Korea. According to most military experts,
there is absolutely no way Taiwan can sustain prolonged attack from across
the Taiwan Strait by the world's third largest Navy (ninety submarines) and
2. Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979). See Appendix-Selected Documents p. 114
infra.
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Air Force (5,000 jet fighters), despite its edge of qualitative superiority and
its control of the Strait.
In fact, Peking's calculus of liberating Taiwan may not be a military one.
It is likely to involve a mixture of psychological, economic and political
warfare, which is a low-cost and low-profile approach that can be ever more
effective. A well-orchestrated military harassment or threat of harassment
to Taiwan's trade can cause serious disruptions to the steady flow of raw
material, technology and capital which constitute the lifeline of Taiwan's
heavily trade-oriented economy. Once this lifeline is shaken, Taiwan could
not maintain political morale and social stability and the island could be
brought to its knees in a relatively short period of time.
Finally, the Carter administration argues that normalizing our relations
with China can enhance peace and stability in Asia. Administration officials
are quick to point out the unusual achievement that for the first time in this
century we have both Japan and China on our side, and that we expect China
to play a major role in the world arena. Thus, the Administration proclaims
that "a secure and strong China" is in the interest of the United States and
the world. Despite repeated official statements that we are pursuing an
"even-handed" policy with China and the Soviet Union, the Soviets are
clearly looking at our new policy posture with great concern and suspicion.
Our willingness to give China most-favored nation treatment. Eximbank
loans and sophisticated advanced technology is naturally causing the Soviets
great alarm. As long as Moscow perceives that we are "tilting" towards
Peking in the delicate balance of superpower politics and that we are playing
the "China Card" against their global strategic interests, we will have to face
whatever consequences may ensue.
Recent escalations of political and military crises in Indochina are clearly
a case in point. Arguably, the way we handled (or mishandled) the process of
normalization and the Chinese connection late last year apparently had
direct bearing on the stepped-up interventions in Kampuchea (Cambodia)
and Laos by the Vietnamese under Soviet support. Moreover, the Chinese
invasion of Vietnam last February, which was viewed to have tacit approval
from Washington, has clearly sped up Soviet build-up in Vietnam in recent
months. We should be fully cognizant that the Soviet Union is the only
adversary which has the capacity to threaten our national security, to engage
in an arms race with us and to challenge our influence on a global scale.
Furthermore, it should be remembered that the military capability that
China is acquiring has no strings attached. The same weapons that China
acquires from us today could be used against our allies tomorrow. In the same
vein, neither can anyone guarantee that the feud between China and the
Soviet Union will never come to an end and that the two powers will not once
more resume their alliance of the 1950s. In this world of uncertainties, our
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foreign policy should be based squarely on our own strength and leadership,
and not on some naive and well-intended assumptions.
COMMENTS
James C. Hsiung*
Since our China policy is only as sound as the conceptual foundation on
which it is based, I propose to take a critical look at that foundation. But first
let me suggest a distinction between "normalization" and a sensible United
States-China policy. I am not questioning the wisdom of the former but
merely questioning whether the China policy pursued by Washington, quite
outside the "normalization" question, is a sensible one.
NORMALIZATION IN THE ERA OF MULTIPLE DETERRENCE
The normalization of relations between the United States and the
People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) took place within the new era of multiple
deterrence, in which the P.R.C. has joined the two super-powers in the
coveted nuclear club. In fact the new era logically compells the termination of
the non-recognition policy of the United States. That logic is inherent in the
drastic transformation of the "rules of the game," as certain fundamental
assumptions underpinning the strategy of conflict developed during the
erstwhile dyadic deterrence period have been rendered invalid or called into
question. While this is a very complex topic, I shall merely focus on one
aspect - with the existence of a third adversary, there can be no winner in
any nuclear conflict. Even assuming the United States wins in a hypothetical
nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, it would have lost in comparison to
China, the bystander whose nuclear capability would remain intact and who,
by default, would emerge as the strongest among the three adversaries.
A few new rules have been called into being as a result of the
transformation of the international system into a "no win" era. In the first
place, the concept of "massive retaliation" that was for so long the central
pillar of nuclear strategy during the previous period is no longer adequate. It
has to be augmented by the concept of "reward," as it is incumbent upon all
the nuclear adversaries to reward one another for not rocking the nuclear
* Professor of Political Science, New York University; Specialist on the foreign
policy of the People's Republic of China.
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boat. Normalization, therefore, is consistent with the logic of mutual reward
in the new era. In order to make the reward structure (i.e., detente) work, a
few other rules must be observed, including "no first use" of nuclear
weaponry, and a commitment not to "gang up" with one against the other
adversary. Stability in the system would be greatly compromised if either of
these two rules should be violated.
THE KISSINGERIAN PREMISES AND THE OPENING TO CHINA
The opening to China and the modality set for it in the Shanghai
Communiqu6 signed by President Nixon in February, 1972' followed certain
premises, or basic assumptions, which can be identified with Henry A.
Kissinger, the architect of Nixon's foreign policy.
The first premise was that the Sino-Soviet split was irreversible. A
corollary to this was that the United States could take advantage of the
Sino-Soviet split by alternately "tilting" to one end and then the other of the
two Communist giants.
The Kissingerian "tilting" strategy ran afoul of one of the maxims (or
"rules of the game") of detente, namely that none of the three principal
adversaries should manipulate either of the other two against the third (i.e.,
no "ganging-up"). In reality, the tilting did not work for the United States,
but alternately alienated the Soviets (hence, the SALT II impasse for a few
years) and the Chinese (resulting in reductions in Sino-U.S. trade in 1975-76
and a temporary return to militant rhetoric in 1976).
The second Kissingerian premise was that China was strong enough to
be a counterweight to the Soviet Union, but not strong enough to threaten
the United States. The obvious fallacy in this premise is its total neglect of
the time element. What if at a given time China is strong enough to threaten
both the Soviet Union and the United States? A statesman should anticipate
such eventualities and make preparations accordingly.
The third premise was that if China was to be encouraged to direct its
undivided attention northward to deal with the Soviets, all her "southern"
problems - i.e., the Vietnam war and the Taiwan question - must be
resolved for her. I would say that the assumption here that decision-makers
can deal with only one issue at a time - that China could not simultaneously
deal with her colossal North and her 'southern" problems - is alarming.
THE BRZEZINSKI PREMISES AND NORMALIZATION
The Carter administration's China policy, extending beyond the normali-
zation of relations with Peking, is based on a set of premises mostly
1. 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. (No. 1708) 435-38 (1972).
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formulated by the National Security Council staff headed by Zbigniew
Brzezinski and assisted by China specialist Michel Oksenberg.
In the first place, the Brzezinski-Oksenberg team has inherited the three
Kissingerian premises above, but has carried the Sino-U.S. triangularity to a
fixation in the sense that every aspect of U.S. foreign policy has become a
function of an overriding animosity toward the Soviet Union. Whereas
Kissinger merely played a "tilting" game, the Brzezinski-Oksenberg team
has entrenched the United States in a game of card playing, i.e., playing the
"China card" against Moscow. The danger of this card playing lies in its
assumption about the permanence of the Sino-Soviet split. It neglects the fact
that the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s was not the result of a temporary
ideological affinity, but of convergent national interests. It was preceded by a
secret alliance in the nineteenth century signed by Li Hung-chang and Count
Witte in 1896, dictated by a common interest against Japan. Common
national interests may again unite the two countries in the future.
Furthermore, the U.S. acceptance, at the Chinese insistence, of the
anti-hegemony clause in the final communiqud signed by President Carter
and Vice Premier Deng on February 1, 1979, violated the "no ganging-up"
prerequisite for detente noted above.2
The most important Brzezinski-Oksenberg addendum to the Kissingerian
legacy is the premise that it is to the U.S. interest to make China a
"responsible" actor. There is a twisted logic in this reasoning which runs like
this: One, if there is instability in the international political supergame, it is
because China has not been acting responsibly. Two, if China has not acted
responsibly, it is because she is not strong enough; so let us make her
stronger. Three, if there is still no stability, then it is because we have not
done enough to make China strong enough to act responsibly; so let us do
more to make her even stronger. The implicit assumption here is that once
made sufficiently strong, reaching a parity with the Soviet Union, China
would be a "responsible" counterweight shielding the United States from the
brunt of the Soviet threat. This goes back to the assumption about the
permanence of the Sino-Soviet rift noted earlier.
The fallacy in the reasoning is its total neglect of the history of
U.S.-Soviet relations. The detente between the two superpowers became
possible only after the Soviets had reached a position of nuclear parity with
the United States, not before. There is every reason to anticipate a parallel
development in Sino-Soviet relations once China has reached parity. At least
our policy-makers should not leave out that possibility in their planning for
the future.
2. 79 DEP'T STATE BULL. (No. 2024) 11-12 (1979).
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Furthermore, what assurance do we have that the Chinese conception of
being a "responsible" actor coincides with our expectations? So far as can be
ascertained, a military invasion of Taiwan, considered a province of China,
would not be an irresponsible act, since it is, as Peking claims, an "internal
affair." A China made sufficiently strong by the United States, with the
expectation that she would turn her newly gained strength against Moscow,
cannot be contained on a collision course over Taiwan, unless the United
States is prepared to abandon the island completely.
The morals from the above are simple and evident: our expectations
about the value of the China connection are only as sound as their conceptual
bases. Most of the premises crucial to our China policy are either faultily
conceived or are not coherent among themselves. Far from having all the
obstacles removed in Sino-U.S. relations, normalization has left behind a
volcano in the Taiwan Strait, the eruption of which depends on Peking's
whims and willful manipulation in the future.
COMMENTS
Jan S. Prybyla*
My comments relate primarily to the luncheon presentation by Roger
Sullivan on the "Value of the Connection."' While I find myself in agreement
with much that Mr. Sullivan has said, there remain aspects of the
presentation which should, I think, be spelled out more clearly than they
have been, and there are some areas where we disagree. My comments fall
into three categories - facts, ability to pay and ability to absorb.
FACTS
Sullivan rightly warns against euphoria in the matter of the China
economic connection. Some of this extraordinary excitement on our side is
generated, no doubt, by the simple, but also illusory, numerical importance
attributed to the China market: 1 billion toothbrushes and 2 billion armpits.
Peking has reinforced this notion with the impression of "no nonsense
* Professor of Economics, Pennsylvania State University; Specialist on the econ-
omy of the People's Republic of China.
1. For the text of Mr. Sullivan's speech, see supra p. 35.
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pragmatism" since the arrest of the Gang of Four and the return of Deng
Xiaoping to somewhere near the top of China's power pyramid. Arguably, the
new leadership is bent on modernizing the country at rapid rates (vide the
targets of the ten year modernization plan), a process which calls for the
acquisition from abroad of huge amounts of very elaborate and very
expensive equipment and technological know-how. Presumably, there is room
for many sellers - not just for the Japanese who got there first - so that,
provided we get in on the deal fast, there will be many benefits accruing to
certain American industries and sectors (and also presumably problems for
some other industries and sectors such as textiles). Trade with the United
States, which now runs at around $1 billion, is expected to rise to roughly $5
billion within the next few years.
In pursuing this line of argument, it is useful to bear in mind the
distinction between present reality and future potential. The reality is that:
1. the per capita gross national product of China is on the order of
$400-450 but very likely less;
2. the average yearly industrial wage (modern industry) is approxi-
mately $360;
3. the bulk of the peasantry makes about 20¢ per person per day
from collective endeavor;
4. the Chinese authorities admit that ten percent of the population
(100 million people) do not have enough to eat (other reports speak of
200 million peasants being in a condition of acute privation);
5. per capita grain production today is the same as it was twenty
years ago;
6. annual foreign trade turnover is less than $20 a head; and
7. the $1 billion current trade with the United States represents
one-third of one percent of total U.S. trade.
So, without in any way minimizing the usefulness of the China economic
connection, it is good to remind ourselves that as of now we are dealing with
I billion very poor customers. Moreover, these customers need our grain and
technology more than we need their bristles and firecrackers. So, at the very
least, we do not have to fall over ourselves in the scramble for a slice of the
existing pie.
But what about the future? The Chinese are a prodigiously assiduous
people, and the communist regime has shown itself capable of mobilizing the
people's energies and channeling them into productive pursuits. The targets
of the ten year modernization plan exemplify the determination of the regime
to raise income by increasing the productivity of labor, capital and land
through massive infusions of up-to-date technology.
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I see two problems with these expectations. First, what we do know of the
plan raises serious questions about its feasibility. The plan strikes me as a set
of random, uncoordinated targets derived from the rule-of-thumb methodolo-
gy "think of a number, then double it." A plan is a general equilibrium
system, an internally consistent set of physical input-output relationships
backed by a price structure which reflects fairly accurately the relative
scarcities and utilities within the system. Given the state of Chinese
economic science, which is still recovering from the severe damage inflicted
by the Cultural Revolution, I doubt that anything even remotely resembling
a plan in this sense exists in China today. Economists such as Sun Yeh-fang
still reel from the beating they got during seven and more years in prison for
having once dared to try and construct a socialist economic science applicable
to China. Techniques of physical planning - i.e., material balances,
input-output tables and linear programming - have been allowed to fall into
disuse and surely the price system must be in serious disrepair by now. (For
example, the wage structure in industry has not been changed since 1956
despite far-reaching changes in the supply of, demand for and skill
composition of labor.)
In this condition, it is curious to see so many business people from so
many countries clamoring to get in on the presumed bonanza. I suspect that,
in other cases, these very same businessmen and bankers would be more
careful. Before extending credit, for example, or setting out on joint ventures,
they would insist on more information and perhaps a feasibility study. Yet
where China is concerned, one gets the impression that normally cautious
and hard-headed entrepreneurs and capitalists succumb to the giddiness
induced by target figures pulled out of nowhere by state and party
bureaucrats who, but three years ago, were described by their opponents
(then in power) as "the scum of the earth." I think it eminently reasonable for
us to ask the Chinese authorities to at least let us see the ten year plan in its
entirety, not just the spotty outline disseminated by the New China News
Agency. A lot of people are likely to go broke if they hitch their fortunes to
what looks like an unrealistic and conceptually primitive set of Chinese
expectations.
The Chinese authorities are beginning to admit as much. The targets are
being reappraised, rethought, retrenched, or whatever the euphemism is for
pulling in the reins and taking a hard look at the whole thing. For example,
the target of 400 million tons of grain by 1985 is said to be not feasible. The
implied growth rate in grain production of four to five percent a year between
1978 and 1985 is quite out of reach. The same applies to the plan to turn out
60 million tons of steel by 1985. (I have heard that as much as half the steel
output in China today is below minimum quality standards set by the state).
The plans for agricultural mechanization have had to be stretched over a
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significantly longer period of time. But as noted before, unrealistic targets
are not the only or even the main issue. The basic issue is how the projected
inputs and outputs mesh; and I suspect that they do not mesh at all because
the Chinese planners have forgotten or do not know that they must mesh. Or
they are quite simply too harassed by contrary political demands to do a
proper job.
Second, there is almost certainly no agreement within the leadership
about the plan. From the changes in direction, the trimming, inflating,
equivocating and patching-up, one gets the unmistakeable impression of
internal discord. The disagreement seems to resolve less around technicalities.
than around the very conception of a great leap to modernity. Philosophical
discord of this kind does not augur well for the future of the plan. Should the
effort fail and the high aspirations raised at the dawn of the post-Mao
leadership be disappointed, the possibility of a neo-Maoist zenophobic turning
inward would, I think, be real. In any event, from the standpoint of the
foreign investor and trader, China is not a nearly riskless society. While not
lawless, it is still, by and large, without a law. While overall political
stability has been demonstrated, there have also been very sharp policy
swings. The present relative openness and outreach are not permanent
fixtures on China's political firmament, nor are they reliable points to what
the future may hold in store.
ABILITY TO PAY
China's ability to pay for all the things she proposes to import from
Japan and the West hinges on the country's capacity to generate a sufficient
volume of commodity and service exports. The repayment problem would be
eased for a while if China could secure sizeable long-term credits from
Western banks and governmental financial institutions. The major burden,
however, falls on commodity exports.
There are three types of commodities which can be used for export in the
next ten years: oil, materials from agriculture (i.e., rice, processed foods) and
manufactures.
Several problems arise in connection with oil exports. First, the quality
of Daging oil leaves much to be desired; the oil has a heavy wax content and
calls for the installation of rather expensive dewaxing facilities in the
importing countries. Japanese refiners, for example, have done this with the
help of sizeable government subsidies. Most of the currently exported oil
comes from the Daging oil field, the output of which has probably peaked.
Second, the bulk of China's projected exportable oil surplus through 1985 has
been committed to Japan under the 1978 Sino-Japanese trade agreement. Of
course, there is the possibility of increasing the surplus by drilling offshore.
WORK SHOP PROCEEDINGS
To reach these deposits, a very large initial investment in exploration and
production equipment is needed as well as "know-how." China will have to
negotiate some combination of loans and joint ventures involving, perhaps,
repayment in the product or even equity participation by foreigners in the
joint undertaking. This will certainly add an acerbic edge to the ongoing
leadership debate on the wisdom of the rapid and vast modernization drive.
While there are no insuperable barriers, and the Chinese hope to use oil as an
important means of paying the modernization bill, the oil export prospects
over the next decade look less bright today than they did a few short years
ago. Incidentally, the currently producing onshore fields are reportedly being
used inefficiently and wastefully. Here, too, large investment in oilfield
technology and equipment is needed if the resource is not to be squandered.
One should also remember that despite China's determination to keep using
coal as the principal energy source in the years ahead, modernization of the
type and on the scale presently envisioned will inevitably lead to a
substantial increase in China's domestic oil consumption. This, too, has to be
factored in when estimating China's future oil exporting capacity. Should the
most optimistic predictions materialize, China's oil will still be sold at
OPEC-type prices.
The main obstacle to expanding exports of agricultural materials is
likely to be the problem of raising farm output at rates substantially above
the rates of natural population increase. In the past, agricultural output has
grown at approximately two percent per year, just marginally above the
growth rate of the population. Chinese agriculture has apparently run into
diminishing returns to labor and almost the only way out of the quandry is to
raise output through increases in factor productivity. This calls for a prior
investment in land melioration, chemicalization, mechanization, improved
transportation, storage and education, with the price tag in the tens of
billions of dollars.
Exports of manufactures will have to negoitate a few major obstacles.
First, over one-third of such exports consists of textiles which are import-
sensitive in most Western countries and Japan; they compete directly with
important domestic industries and evoke protectionist responses in no time at
all. The United States has just slapped an import restriction on Chinese
textiles. Second, there are problems of marketing Chinese products in highly
sophisticated and fickle Western markets; both the quality of the goods and
the quality of marketing techniques are at issue. Third, there is the
competition from other low cost producers such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore.
It is not my intention to paint a gloomy picture of China's modernization
and foreign trade prospects in the coming decade or so. I am merely trying to
inject a dose of sobriety into the consideration of a problem which is complex
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and, for the Chinese side, very arduous. I believe the record indicates that the
Chinese will find it difficult to raise their hard currency commodity exports to
heights consonant with the level of imports desired by them at this time.
Service income includes tourism and hard currency remittances from
overseas Chinese. The latter fluctuate over time, roughly in line with China's
policy toward the relatives in China of overseas Chinese. In recent times,
such remittances came to about $500 million a year. The new regime's policy
on overseas Chinese and their families in China is benign. As long as this
lasts, remittances are likely to continue at or exceed current levels. Before
tourism amounts to very much, $1.5 billion will have to be invested in 15,000
new hotel rooms. It is interesting to note that in recent months the People's
Republic of China (P.R.C.) has increased her involvement in real estate
speculation and hotel ownership in booming Hong Kong.
China's past loan repayment record has been exemplary and on the basis
of this performance, the country has an excellent credit rating in the world
financial community. In the past China pursued a very conservative foreign
credit and balance of trade policy which, as much as anything else, explains
the spotless credit history. The policy, now decried by the Chinese author-
ities, had been to shun joint ventures and long-term indebtedness to foreign
banks and governments, and to avoid overall balance of trade deficits. If in
any one year a sizeable deficit on the trading account developed, it would be
reversed in subsequent years by the simple expedient of slashing imports. In
general, until the fall of the Gang of Four, foreign trade was regarded by the
Chinese authorities as a residual activity. China went out and bought what
she could not make at home, paying with such exports as it could manage to
push. Today, the picture is quite different. Foreign trade is taken to be the
key link in the modernization process; it is to be actively promoted in the
years to come; and a flexible attitude toward credit and other arrangements
is to replace the rigidities of the past.
China's credit history is not necessarily a reliable indicator of China's
future credit performance. This is not to suggest that the P.R.C. will
massively default on her obligations or that she takes such obligations
lightly. But China's present borrowing plans bear little relationship to past
practice and must be examined on their own precise merits. This cannot be
done unless the Chinese authorities release fuller information than they have
done so far on their assets, liabilities, reserves and debt service ratios. If
China wants to participate in the world economic community, she should be
made to understand that continued obsessive secrecy regarding her economic
performance constitutes unacceptable conduct. Are Chinese foreign exchange
reserves $2 billion (as reported by the Christian Science Monitor on March 28,
1979) or are they $4 billion (as reported by the Bank for International
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Settlements)? Both figures should be set against the tenative $7 billion in
equipment and technology import contracts signed by early 1979.
A whole profitable breed of consultants with allegedly "inside" informa-
tion has been spawned lately in and around Washington and New York to
help American China traders find their way in the dark. Estimates (they are
usually referred to as "informed" estimates to lend them a degree of dignity
and credibility) of Chinese import plans between 1978 and 1985 range from
$40 billion to $200 billion - not a very informative range. In 1976, it was
estimated that China had a debt service ratio (ratio of foreign repayment
obligations to total hard currency earnings) of twenty-three percent, not far
from the warning mark of twenty-five percent. A later U. S. government
study predicted that the ratio between 1981 and 1985 would range from four
to eleven percent and if downpayments are included, the upper limit would be
as high as fifteen percent. Later, a figure of twenty-one percent was
mentioned for the same period. Statistics d la carte; something to suit every
taste.
The Chinese make up for the statistical confusion by being the world's
most gracious hosts, when they decide to be so. But impeccable manners and
hearty fellowship do not make up for the absence of good information flows.
That is why I do not go along with the advice given by one U. S. executive
(who has had twelve months' experience of dealing with the Chinese). He
suggests to "shy away from legalese" and "laugh with them." If I am not
mistaken, some such suggestions have also been floated at this Conference.
Chinese culture, it is argued, is not our culture. The Chinese (at least on the
mainland) dispense with all our "whereas'es" because things are just
understood and taken for granted over there, and there is no need to spell
them out. You might even offend the chaps by insisting too much on
insurance claims when you lend them a billion dollars here and there.
ABILITY To ABSORB
Absorption of advanced technology and equipment has four aspects:
technical, institutional, political and cultural. The degree of absorption
difficulty varies with the degree of technological sophistication, the size of the
transfer and the time span allowed for digesting the new equipment and
techniques. The more advanced the technology, the more massive the
transfer; the shorter the time in which that transfer is to be accomplished,
the greater the absorptive difficulty. Technically, there seems to be little
point in importing high technology equipment when supporting services are
lacking. It is useless to import a computer when you do not have computer
operators or buy a tractor when you do not have tractor drivers, mechanics or
repair facilities. Technology, like economic planning, is an integrated process,
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not a series of random stabs. I believe that it is precisely in the area of the
needed technological linkages that contemporary China is weak. The
weakness can be overcome, but not in the time period assigned by the plan.
Institutionally, the question is whether the economy's arrangements are
capable of supporting the vast modernization effort. I have discussed this
problem elsewhere,' and will only mention three factors: poor planning, poor
incentives to workers and poor management. The deficiencies of planning
have already been noted.' Deficient incentives to workers (resulting in a
loosening up of "labor discipline") are admitted by the present leadership. To
properly motivate the workers - i.e., spur them to use the new equipment
and techniques in ways that will raise factor productivity calls for nothing
short of a wholesale revision of the wage and rural incomes structures, both
as regards the general level of earnings and income differentials. More
consumer goods will have to be provided, without which increases in money
incomes (already ordered) only make things worse. (Inflation is presently
running at about ten percent a year in China.) Raising output by massive
organizational means (mass mobilizations of labor) is losing its effectiveness,
as are appeals to the workers' sense of moral responsibility, class conscious-
ness and patriotism. The shabby spectacle at the top is not likely to
invigorate the masses' flagging moral commitment to socialism. One of the
most worrisome problems is sloppy enterprise management, not because of any
particular lack of ability among the managerial cadres (although this, too, is
a problem with the graduates of the Cultural Revolution), but because of
chronic dialectical exercises and the consequent uncertainty of the political
line at the top. Managers are paralyzed by fear that what they do today may
be used against them tomorrow. There are solid historical grounds for this
apprehension. The result is managerial inertia.
Politically, absorption hinges on whether the present modernizing
regime will survive the plan it has set for the country. There are signs of rift
within the leadership, and the possibility of a return to some of Mao's more
obscurantist policies cannot be altogether excluded.
Finally, there is the question of whether China will be able to make the
cultural adjustments necessary for the enormous leap into modernity.
Massive transfers of advanced technology over brief periods of time have been
known to unsettle some developing societies in various parts of the world. It
is true that in the last thirty years China was subjected to great cultural
transformations and hugh value upheavals. Still, the magnitude of the
proposed changes, their high technological content and the briefness of time
2. Prybyla, Changes in the Chinese Economy: An Interpretation, ASIAN SURVEY
409-53 (May 1979).
3. See supra at 47-48.
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allotted to the process will surely put much strain on the fabric of China's
rural society.
All these considerations, diverse as they are, seem to be highly relevant
to our gaining a balanced perspective of China's modernization, her foreign
trade prospects and the value to the United States of the China economic
connection.

